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Abstract 
What are the effects of financial market imperfections on unemployment and vacancies? 
Since standard DSGE models do not typically model unemployment, they abstract from 
this issue. In this paper I augment a standard monetary DSGE model with explicit 
financial and labour market frictions and estimate the model using US data for the period 
1964:Q1-2010:Q3. I find that the estimated degree of financial frictions is higher when 
financial data and shocks are included. The model matches the aggregate volatility in the 
data reasonably well. In particular, for the labour market, the model is able to generate 
highly volatile unemployment and vacancies, and a relatively rigid real wage. Further, I 
find that the financial accelerator mechanism plays an important role in amplifying the 
effects of financial shocks on unemployment and vacancies. Overall, financial shocks 
explain about 37 per cent of the fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. 
JEL classification: E32, E44, J6 
Bank classification: Economic models; Financial markets; Labour markets  
Résumé 
Quels effets les imperfections des marchés financiers ont-elles sur le chômage et l’offre 
d’emplois? Cette question est absente des études qui s’appuient sur les modèles 
d’équilibre général dynamiques et stochastiques (EGDS) courants, puisque ceux-ci 
formalisent rarement le phénomène du chômage. L’auteure incorpore des frictions 
financières et un marché du travail soumis à des frictions dans un modèle monétaire 
EGDS type, qu’elle estime sur des données américaines s’étalant du 1
er trimestre de 1964 
au 3
e trimestre de 2010. Les frictions financières estimées sont plus intenses lorsque des 
données et des chocs de nature financière sont ajoutés. Le modèle restitue assez bien la 
volatilité globale observée dans les données. Plus précisément, la forte volatilité du 
chômage et de l’offre d’emplois est reproduite, de même que la relative rigidité des 
salaires réels. L’auteure constate en outre que le mécanisme d’accélérateur financier joue 
un rôle important car il amplifie l’incidence des chocs financiers sur le chômage et l’offre 
d’emplois. Dans l’ensemble, ces chocs expliquent environ 37  % des fluctuations du 
chômage et de l’offre d’emplois. 
Classification JEL : E32, E44, J6 




The recent ﬁnancial crisis has been associated with a signiﬁcant rise in the unemployment rate
in the US. The unemployment rate more than doubled from 4.8 per cent at the beginning of the re-
cession to peak at 10 per cent in the last quarter of 2009. Determining the extent to which ﬁnancial
market imperfections may have contributed to ﬂuctuations in unemployment in the labour market
and the extent to which monetary policy may have helped to alleviate those ﬂuctuations has however
proved difﬁcult: On the one hand, models that study the effects of ﬁnancial frictions on unemploy-
ment are often too stylized for making quantitative statements. On the other hand, DSGE models
that are more suited to quantitative exercises have typically abstracted from modeling the interac-
tion between ﬁnancial imperfection and the labour market. The purpose of this paper is two-fold:
(i) First, develop and estimate a quantitative macroeconomic model that incorporates both labour
and ﬁnancial market frictions using US time series data from 1964Q1 to 2010Q3; (ii) Second, ex-
plore the interaction of ﬁnancial and labour market frictions, and assess quantitatively, through this
interaction, how important it is to consider ﬁnancial frictions and shocks when addressing labour
market dynamics.
There is an important strand of literature that studies the effect of ﬁnancial market imperfections
on unemployment. These studies usually assume that there exists some difﬁculties for ﬁrms to
access credit and these difﬁculties affect ﬁrms’ hiring decisions. For example, Wasmer and Weil
(2004) assume that new entrepreneurs have no wealth of their own and must raise funds in an
imperfect credit market before they enter the labour market to search for workers. Acemoglu (2001)
studies an environment in which an agent decides to become an entrepreneur or a worker. For
entrepreneurs to be able to hire workers, they either need to borrow the necessary funds or use their
own wealth. Both studies show that credit frictions lead to higher unemployment levels. Recent
studiesfocusmoreontheeffectsofcreditfrictionsonthedynamicsofunemploymentandvacancies.
Petrosky-Nadeau (2009) assumes that ﬁrms must seek external funds over their net worth to ﬁnance
current vacancies and the credit market is subject to costly state veriﬁcation type frictions. He shows
that the credit market frictions amplify and propagate the responses of unemployment and vacancies
to productivity shocks. Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2010) study the importance of ﬁnancial
markets for unemployment ﬂuctuations, where ﬁrms can issue debt under limited enforcement of
debt contracts. They indicate that in this environment credit shocks can generate large employment
ﬂuctuations.
However, the abovementioned models are stylized models that in most cases only consider the
effects of productivity shocks on unemployment. Without other frictions or competing shocks, it
is difﬁcult to quantify the contribution of credit frictions or shocks to labour market ﬂuctuations.
DSGE models, in contrast, can allow for many shocks and frictions, and thus are more suited for
quantitative exercises. However, although the recent literature in medium-scale DSGE models has
shown a growing interest in the role of ﬁnancial factors in business cycle ﬂuctuations (Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1999, herein BGG; and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno 2007), it has largelyabstracted from modeling unemployment in models where ﬁnancial factors play an important role.
One exception is Christiano, Trabandt and Waletin (2007) (herein CTW). CTW introduce BGG-
type ﬁnancial frictions and unemployment into a monetary DSGE model in a small open economy
setting, and estimate their model using Swedish data. They ﬁnd that ﬁnancial shocks account for 10
per cent of the volatility in unemployment in the Swedish economy.
This paper augments a standard DSGE model with ﬁnancial and labour market frictions along
the lines of CTW. The ﬁnancial market frictions are modeled as in BGG. Due to information asym-
metry, thereareﬁnancialfrictionsintheaccumulationandmanagementofcapital. BGGhaveshown
that this type of friction can amplify and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy (ﬁnancial accelera-
tor mechanism). The labour market frictions are modeled in a search and matching framework, and
the wage setting frictions (staggered wage contracting) are modeled as in Gertler, Sala and Trigari
(2008) (herein, GST).1 As in CTW, the model economy is also subject to multiple shocks, including
both productivity and ﬁnancial shocks. But unlike CTW, this paper focuses on the transmission
mechanism of ﬁnancial shocks to labour market activities. In particular, this paper highlights the
important role of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in amplifying the responses in unemployment
and vacancies to ﬁnancial shocks. Moreover, this paper attempts to analyze how the interaction
between ﬁnancial shocks and wage setting frictions affects labour market outcomes.
In this paper, ﬁnancial imperfections affect unemployment and vacancies in the following way:
After a negative ﬁnancial shock that reduces the entrepreneurs’ net worth, the worsened balance-
sheet position leads entrepreneurs to face a higher risk premium on their external borrowing due
to BGG-type frictions in the ﬁnancial market. Since the external ﬁnancing becomes more costly,
the demand for capital declines. Given the constant returns to scale aggregate production function,
it is optimal for entrepreneurs to keep a constant capital labour ratio. Thus, the demand for labour
declines as well, leading ﬁrms to post fewer vacancies. This reduces the labour market tightness and
the probability for a worker to ﬁnd a job, leading fewer workers to leave the unemployment state.
In this model, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial shock and generates large
ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies even though ﬁrms’ vacancy postings are not subject to
ﬁnancial frictions directly (spillover effects of the ﬁnancial factors).
I estimate the model using US data including ﬁnancial time series data. The main ﬁndings of
the paper are the following. First, the model matches the aggregate volatility in the data reasonably
well. In particular, the model is able to generate highly volatile unemployment and vacancies, and
a relatively rigid real wage. Second, the ﬁnancial wealth shock, the shock affecting net worth in
the entrepreneurs’ sector, accounts for around 37 per cent of the variations of unemployment and
vacancies. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes the effect of the ﬁnancial
wealth shock. Reducing ﬁnancial frictions by half decreases the contribution of the ﬁnancial shock
to the variations in the key labour market variables by one third. Third, I ﬁnd that adding ﬁnancial
1Since the staggered wage contracting in GST (2008) does not have a direct impact on on-going worker employer
relations, it is not vulnerable to the Barro (1977) critique of sticky wages.
2data into estimation generates a higher value for the elasticity of external ﬁnance, the key parameter
capturing ﬁnancial frictions, leading to a larger ampliﬁcation effect from the ﬁnancial accelerator.
The estimation results without using ﬁnancial data do not come close to generating the relative
volatility of unemployment and vacancies observed in the data. Lastly, in order to examine the
stability of the sample estimates, I divide the data into two subsamples: the ﬁrst period is from
1966:2 -1979:2 (“Great Inﬂation” period), and the second period is from 1984:1-2010:3, which
covers the “Great Moderation” period and the recent recession. I ﬁnd that ﬁnancial shocks are much
more persistent and account for a higher portion of variations in unemployment and vacancies in
the US in the second period.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the model, and then go on to
discussthedataandestimationstrategy. InSection4Ipresenttheestimationresultsanddiscusswhy
the ﬁnancial shock is important in explaining the variations in the key labour market variables. In
Section 5, I discuss several issues regarding the robustness of the results. Finally, section 6 contains
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section I describe the model economy. I consider an economy populated by a representa-
tive household, retailers, entrepreneurs, capital producers and employment agencies. Each member
in the household consumes, holds nominal bonds, and decides whether to provide labour inelasti-
cally to employment agencies. Employment agencies hire workers from a frictional labour market,
which is subject to an aggregate matching function. The nominal wage paid to an individual worker
is determined by Nash bargaining. However, in each period an employment agency has a ﬁxed prob-
ability that it may renegotiate the wage. Employment agencies make hiring decisions and supply
labour services to entrepreneurs at the price of marginal productivity of the labour services. En-
trepreneurs also acquire capital from capital producers. Since entrepreneurs have to obtain external
ﬁnance for their capital purchasing, they are subject to ﬁnancial market frictions. Retailers purchase
the wholesale goods produced by entrepreneurs and differentiate at no cost and sell them to ﬁnal
good producers, who aggregate differentiated goods into a homogeneous good and supply it to the
representative household.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household with a continuum of members of measure one. The number of
family members currently employed is nt. The employed family members earn nominal wage wn
t .
The unemployed members receive unemployment beneﬁt bt. Each member has the following period
utility function
u(ct) = et log(ct);
3where ct is consumption of ﬁnal goods in period t and where et is a preference shock which follows







Following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), I assume that family members are perfectly insured
against the risk of being unemployed, thus consumption is the same for each family member. The






The wage income from the employed family members is wn
t nt, where wn
t is determined by Nash
bargaining between employment agencies and workers and nt is determined by a search and match
process in the labour market. The household also earns income from owning equity in retailers t,
pays tax Tt and saves by holding a one-period riskless bond Bt. Assuming that the aggregate price











t 1 is the nominal rate of return on the riskless bond.
The household maximizes its expected lifetime utility equation (1) subject to equation (2). The














2.2 Wholesale Firms (Entrepreneurs)
As in BGG, ﬁrms are risk-neutral and manage the production of wholesale goods. The production
function for wholesale goods is given by
y(j) = f(kt(j);lt(j)) = !t(j)(kt(j))
(ztlt(j))
1 :
At the end of period t   1, entrepreneurs purchase capital kt(j) from capital producers and use it
in period t to produce wholesale goods with labour service lt(j), which is supplied by employment
agencies in a competitive labour market. Production is subject to two type of shocks: !t is the
idiosyncraticshock, whichisprivateinformationtotheentrepreneurandisi.i.d acrossentrepreneurs
and time, with mean E[!t(j)] = 1; zt is an exogenous technology shock that is common to all the
entrepreneurs, and it follows







4Capital purchased at the end of period t, kt+1(j), is partly ﬁnanced from the entrepreneur’s net
worth, Nt+1(j), and partly from issuing nominal debt, Bt(j):




where qt is the price of capital relative to the aggregate price pt. Note that, unlike in BGG, the debt
contract in this model is in nominal terms. That is, entrepreneurs sign a debt contract that speciﬁes
a nominal interest rate. To ensure that entrepreneurs will never accumulate enough funds to ﬁnance
capital acquisitions entirely out of net worth, following BGG, I assume that they have ﬁnite lives.
The probability that an entrepreneur survives until the next period is e.
The ﬁnancial market imperfections are similar to those in BGG: because the idiosyncratic shock
!t(j) is private information for the borrowers (entrepreneurs), there exists information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders (ﬁnancial intermediaries). Due to costly state veriﬁcation, lenders
have to pay an auditing cost to observe the output of the borrowers. In BGG the optimal contract
is a standard debt with costly bankruptcy: if the entrepreneur does not default, the lender receives
a ﬁxed payment independent of !t(j) but contingent upon the aggregate state; if the entrepreneur
defaults, the lender audits and seizes the realized return (net of monitoring costs). The risk premium
associated with external funds, s(:), is deﬁned as the ratio of the entrepreneur’s cost of external












t+1 is the expected rate of return of capital (deﬁned in the next section), which is equal
to the expected cost of external funds in equilibrium, and Et[rn
t
pt
pt+1] is the cost of internal funds.
BGG solve a ﬁnancial contract that maximizes the payoff to the entrepreneur, subject to the lender
earning the required rate of return. BGG shows that this contract implies that the external ﬁnance








0(:) > 0 and s(1) = 1.2 Equation (5) expresses that the external ﬁnance premium increases
with leverage, or decreases with the share of entrepreneurs’ capital investment that is ﬁnanced by the
entrepreneur’s own net worth. This is because when entrepreneurs rely more on external ﬁnancing,
the riskiness of loans increases. Lenders’ expected loss increases and thus they charge a higher risk
premium.
2See Appendix A in BGG for details.
52.2.1 Entrepreneurs’ problem













t is the relative price of wholesale goods, pl
t is the relative price of labour service which
is provided by employment agencies, and bt is the real debt (bt = Bt=Pt). Thus the net worth is
the entrepreneurs’ earnings: pw





1+t bt 1(j). The proﬁt for the entrepreneur j is given by
t(j) = bt(j) + Nt+1(j)   qtkt+1(j)






























+ qt+1(1   )] = 0; (8)
and




] = 0: (9)
Equation (7) shows in the equilibrium the price for labour service is equal to its marginal produc-











The left hand side of the equation (10) is the expected return of capital, which depends on the
marginal productivity of capital pw
t+1
@yt+1(j)
@kt+1(j) and the capital gain
qt+1(1 )
qt . The right hand of the
equation is the expected cost of external funds, which is a product of risk premium st and the
expected cost of internal funds
rn
t







@kt+1(j) + qt+1(1   )]
qt
: (11)
62.2.2 Aggregate Demand for labour Services, Capital and Financial Frictions
In this section I characterize the key equations that describe the aggregate behaviour for the en-
trepreneurial sector: equations for the aggregate demand curves for labour and capital, the equation
for the aggregate stock of entrepreneurial net worth. I also address how the ﬁnancial shock affects
the demand for labour services in the model.3
Aggregate Demand for labour and Capital





















kt+1 + qt+1(1   )]
qt
: (13)
Thus, the equilibrium labour services is determined by the demand from the entrepreneurs (equation












which is the aggregate supply curve for external ﬁnancing derived from equation (4).
Aggregate Net Worth









The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t, Nt+1, is the sum of equity held
by entrepreneurs surviving from period t   1. Following Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007),
I assume that there is a ﬁnancial wealth shock, an exogenous shock to the survival probability of
entrepreneurs, t, which follows an AR(1) process:







The reason why the shock on the survival probability of entrepreneurs has effects on their ﬁnancial
wealth is as follows: in the model, the number of entrepreneurs exiting is balanced by the number
that enter. Since those who exit usually have more net worth than those who enter, when a positive
3See Appendix A for a more detailed derivation for this section’s equations.
7shock occurs, the aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs increases. This drives down the external
ﬁnance premium, leading entrepreneurs to purchase more capital, which drives up asset price and
increases entrepreneurs’ net worth even more.
Entrepreneurs going out of business will consume their residual equity,
c
e













t is the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in period t.
Demand for labour Services and the Financial Shock (spillover effect)
As equation (5) suggests, the external ﬁnance premium st depends on net worth Nt. After a
positive ﬁnancial wealth shock (an increase in the survival probability of entrepreneurs), aggregate
net worth increases and the leverage falls. Since the entrepreneurs’ balance-sheet position improves,
the external ﬁnance premium falls. As a result, the demand for capital increases after a positive
ﬁnancial shock. The demand for labour services increases as well after the shock. To understand
this, I rewrite equation (12)
p
w


















Equation (16) suggests that given the relative wholesale goods price pw
t , the price for labour services
pl
t, a constant capital labour ratio kt
lt is optimal for entrepreneurs if the technology shock is absent.
Thus, if a ﬁnancial shock drives up the demand for capital, it will drive up the demand for labour
services as well.
2.3 Employment Agencies
Following CTW, I assume that the key labour market activities–vacancy postings, wage bargaining–
are all carried out by employment agencies instead of entrepreneurs themselves.4 I assume that
entrepreneurs obtain labour services supplied by employment agencies in a competitive labour mar-
ket. Each employment agency i supplies labour services nt(i). The labour market is modeled using
a search framework. The employment agencies make vacancy posting decisions and bargain with
workers over nominal wages. I follow GST assuming a staggered multiple period nominal wage
contracting.
In the next subsections, I describe the matching function, employment agencies’ and workers’
problem, and wage dynamics under this staggered Nash bargaining mechanism.
4Assuming that entrepreneurs face a frictional labour market will complicate aggregation.
82.3.1 Unemployment, Vacancies and Matching
At the beginning of period t, each employment agency i posts vt(i) vacancies in order to attract
new workers and employs nt(i) workers. The total number of vacancies and employed workers are
vt =
R
vt(i)di and nt =
R
nt(i)di: The number of unemployed workers at the beginning of period t
is
ut = 1   nt:







where m is a parameter governing the matching efﬁciency. The probability a ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy
in period t, ql







Similarly, the probability that a searching worker ﬁnds a job, sl







Both ﬁrms and workers take ql
t and sl
t as given. In each period, a fraction 1  of existing workforce
nt exogenously separates from the ﬁrms. Thus, the total labour force is the sum of the number of
surviving workers and the new matches:
nt+1 = nt + mt: (17)
2.3.2 Employment Agencies’ Problem
To maximize comparability with the rest of the model, I assume that there are many employment
agencies that supply labour services at a competitive price pl
t. These agencies combine labour
supplied by households into homogeneous labour services nt =
R
nt(i)di and supply them to en-
trepreneurs. This leaves the equilibrium conditions associated the production of wholesale goods
unaffected even though the labour market is frictional. Deﬁne the hiring rate, xt(i), as the ratio of
new hires, ql






Due to the law of large numbers the employment agency knows the likelihood ql
t that each vacancy
will be ﬁlled. The hiring rate is thus the employment agency’s control variable. The total labour























2xt(i)2nt(i) is the quadratic labour adjustment costs of posting vacancies, and Ett;t+1
is the employment agency’s discount rate with t;t+1 = ct+1=ct. At any time, the employment
agency chooses the hiring rate xt(i) to maximize Ft(i), given the existing employment stock, nt; the
probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, ql
t; and the current and expected path of wages, wn
t:: Jt(i), the value
to the employment agency of adding another worker at time t; can be obtained by differentiating











2 + ( + xt(i))Ett;t+1Jt+1(i): (18)
The ﬁrst order condition for vacancy posting equates the marginal cost of adding a worker with the
discounted marginal beneﬁt:
xt(i) = Ett;t+1Jt+1(i): (19)











2 + Ett;t+1Jt+1(i): (20)

























The value to a worker of employment at agency i, Vt(i); is,
Vt(i) = wt(i) + Ett;t+1[Vt+1(i) + (1   )Ut+1]:
10The average value of employment on being a new worker at time t, Vt; is5








The value of unemployment, Ut; depends on the unemployment beneﬁt  b and the probability of
being employed versus unemployed next period:
Ut =  b + Ett;t+1[s
l
t+1Vt+1 + (1   s
l
t+1)Ut+1]:
The worker surplus at ﬁrm i, Ht(i), and the average worker surplus, Ht, are given by:
Ht(i) = Vt(i)   Ut;
and
Ht = Vt   Ut:
It follows that:
Ht(i) = wt(i)   b + Ett;t+1[Ht+1(i)   s
l
t+1Ht+1]: (21)
2.3.4 Nash Bargaining and Wage Dynamics
Inthissection, Iintroducethestaggeredmulti-periodwagecontractinganddescribewagedynamics.
A more explicit derivation is provided in Appendix B. Every period, each employment agency has
a ﬁxed probability 1    that it may renegotiate the nominal wage wn




the beginning of period t, for employment agencies that are allowed to renegotiate the wage, they
negotiate with the existing workforce, including the new hires. Due to constant returns, all workers
are the same at the margin. For employment agencies that are not allowed to renegotiate the wage,
all existing and newly hired workers receive the wage paid in the previous period. This simple
Poisson adjustment process implies that it is not necessary to keep track of individual ﬁrms’ wage
histories, which simpliﬁes aggregation. Given constant returns, all sets of renegotiating employment
agencies and workers at time t face the same problem, and set the same nominal wage, wn
t . Thus,








t (i) = w
n
t with probability 1   
= w
n
t 1 with probability ;





























Let t = pt
@Ht(i)
@wn
t (i) and t =  pt
@Jt(i)
@wn
t (i) and it can be shown that
t = t:
Given this, the ﬁrst order condition for wages (equation 22) becomes the conventional sharing rule:6
Jt(i) = (1   )Ht(i): (23)
However, due to the staggered wage contracting, Jt(i) and Ht(i) are different from the period-by-
period Nash bargaining. To examine this, I ﬁrst use Wt(i) to denote the sum of expected future






= wt(i) + Ett;t+1wt+1(i) + Et
2
2t;t+2wt+2(i) + :::;
which can be written as
Wt(i) = tw


















6Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) suggest t > t . This means that ﬁrms place a
greater weight on the future than the workers do since ﬁrms have a longer horizon. This horizon effect makes ﬁrms
more patient than workers and thus reduces the workers’ bargaining power. However, it is not the case here.
12Using Wt(i), Ht(i) and Jr(i) can be written as















































Equations (25) and (26) suggest that with multi-period contracting, Ht(i) and Jt(i) will depend on
. In the limiting case of  = 0, Ht(i) and Jt(i) collapse to the values in the conventional period-
by-period Nash bargaining. Substituting equations (25) and (26) into the Nash bargaining ﬁrst-order
condition,
Jt(i) = (1   )Ht(i);













The ﬁrst two terms of equation (27) are conventional components for Nash bargaining solutions
for wages: the ﬁrst term is the worker’s contribution to the match and the second is the workers’
opportunity cost. The third term is from the staggered multi-period contracting. Following Gertler
and Trigari (2009), I deﬁne a target wage wtar
t (i) as the sum of the ﬁrst two terms:
w
tar





t(i)) + (1   )( b + s
l
t+1t;t+1Ht+s+1):
The target wage is computed as the wage that would arise under period-by-period Nash bargaining
for the employment agency i, taking as given that all other employment agencies and workers op-
erates on multi-period wage contracts. It is different from the conventional Nash bargaining wage
w
flex













t+1xt) + (1   ) b:










and rewrite the target wage equation as
w
tar














































where the ﬁrst term is w
flex
t and wt is the aggregate real wage, which is deﬁned below. As suggested
in Gertler and Trigari (2009), equation (28) reﬂects the impact of spillovers of economy-wide aver-
age wages on the individual bargaining wage between the employment agency and worker. When
wt exceeds w
t; everything else equal, it suggests workers’ outside options are good. This will raise
the target wage. The reverse happens if wt is below w
t. The stickiness in the aggregate wage affects
the individual wage bargain by this type of spillover, adding more inertia to the individual wages.
In addition, the relative hiring rate, xt(i)   xt, can generate spillovers as well.









Thus in real terms we have







Capital production is assumed to be subject to an investment-speciﬁc shock, t. Capital producers
purchase the ﬁnal goods from retailers as investment goods, it, and produce efﬁcient investment
goods, tit. Efﬁcient investment goods are then combined with the existing capital stock to produce
new capital goods, kt+1. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
kt+1 = tit + (1   )kt:
14The shock t follows the ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:







Capital producers are also subject to a quadratic capital adjustment cost ,

2( it
kt   )2kt. The proﬁt
















and the ﬁrst-order condition is
Et









There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure 1. Retailers buy whole-
sale goods from entrepreneurs and produce a good of variety j. Let yt(j) be the retail good sold by




























Following Calvo (1983), each retailer cannot change prices unless it receives a random signal. The
probability of receiving such a signal is 1   . Thus, in each period, only a fraction of 1    of
retailers reset their prices, while the remaining retailers keep their prices unchanged. Given the
demand function equation (31), the retailer chooses pt(j) to maximize its expected real total proﬁt















t;i  ict+i=ct is the stochastic discount factor and the real marginal cost, mct, is the price
of wholesale goods relative to the price of ﬁnal goods (pw;t=pt). Let p
t be the optimal price chosen



















The aggregate price evolves according to:
pt = [p
1 "







I assume that the government spending is gt and it balances its budget,
gt = Tt;
where gt follows an AR(1) process,







2.7 Monetary Policy Rules
The central bank is assumed to operate according to the standard Taylor Rule. The central bank
adjusts the nominal interest rate, rn
t , in response to deviations of inﬂation, t, from its steady-state



















where rn,  and y are the steady-state values of rn
t , t and yt, and "m





, y and r are policy coefﬁcients chosen by the central bank.
2.8 Aggregation and Equilibrium




1  = ct + c
e














Furthermore, for the labour market we have
lt = nt:
163 Data and Estimation
3.1 Data
I ﬁrst log-linearize the model around the steady-state. Appendix D and E contain the complete log-
linear model, as well as the steady-state conditions. I then adopt a Bayesian approach to estimate the
model. I use six series of quarterly US data: output, consumption, investment, nominal interest rate,
inﬂation and external ﬁnance cost. The sample spans from 1964Q1 to 2010Q3. Data on output,
consumption and investment are expressed in per capita terms using the civilian population aged
15 and up. Output is measured by real GDP. Consumption is measured by real expenditures of
non-durable goods, services and durable goods. Investment is measured by real private investment.
The nominal interest rate is measured by Federal Funds rate expressed in quarterly terms. Inﬂation
is the quarter-to-quarter growth rate of the GDP deﬂator. External ﬁnance costs are measured by
U.S. business prime lending rate in real terms. All the series are detrended using an HP ﬁlter with
smoothing parameter 1600.
Table 1: Calibrated Values
 discount factor 0.99
 inverse of intertemporal substitution of consumption 2
 capital share 0.33
 capital depreciation rate 0.025
 intermediate-good elasticity of substitution 11
N=k steady-state ratio of net worth to capital 0.6
e survivor rate of entrepreneurs 0.985
 survival rate of ﬁrms 0.90
sl job ﬁnding rate 0.95
ql job ﬁlling rate 0.75
 bargaining power of workers 0.5
~ b parameter for unemployment ﬂow value 0.4
m elasticity in matches to unemployment 0.5
3.2 Calibrated Values
As is standard when taking DSGE models to the data, the parameters for which the data used
contain only limited information are calibrated to match salient features of the U.S. economy. Table
1 reports the calibrated values. There are 13 parameters. Two of them are for ﬁnancial market, six of
them are for labour market, and the rest of the parameters are “conventional” parameters. Financial
market parameters include the survival rate of entrepreneurs, e, and the steady-state ratio of net
worth to capital N=k. I set e = 0:985 so that the steady-state external risk premium is 200 basis
points, which is the sample average spread between the prime lending rate and Federal Funds rate.
17I also set N=k to 0.6, which is close to the value used in Christensen and Dib (2008). In calibration,







where  is the elasticity of external risk premium with respect to leverage and  > 0.  is a “reduced
form” parameter capturing ﬁnancial market frictions.
For the labour market parameters, I set the bargaining power parameter, ; to be 0.5, which is
commonly used in the literature. The elasticity of matches to unemployment, m; is set to to be 0.5,
the midpoint of values typically used. The job separation rate, 1   , is set to be 0.1, matching the
average job duration of two and a half years in the US. The job ﬁnding rate sl is set to be 0.95 as in
Shimer (2005). The average job ﬁlling rate ql is set to 0.75, which is suggested by den Haan, Ramey
and Watson (2000). Following GST, I express  b, the steady state ﬂow value of unemployment as






where ~ b is the fraction of the contribution of the worker to the job. I choose ~ b to be 0.4, following
Shimer (2005).
I use conventional values for the ﬁve ”conventional” parameters. The discount factor  is set to
be 0:99, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate in the steady-state at four per cent. The
curvature parameter in the utility function, , is set to 2, implying an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of 0.5. The steady-state depreciation rate, , is set to 0:025, which implies an annual
rate of depreciation of ten per cent. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function, , is set to be
1=3. The steady-state price mark up "=("   1) is 1:1 by setting " = 11.
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters: Baseline
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Risk premium elasticity  gamma (0.05,0.02) 0.230 0.240 0.203 0.288
Calvo wage parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.810 0.806 0.777 0.833
Calvo price parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.538 0.530 0.470 0.590
Capital adj. cost parameter  norm (0.25, 0.05) 0.217 0.216 0.144 0.292
Taylor rule inertia r beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.275 0.292 0.213 0.372
Taylor rule inﬂation  gamma(1.5, 0.1) 1.675 1.685 1.562 1.782
Taylor rule output gap y norm (0.125, 0.15) -0.006 -0.007 -0.022 0.008
18Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters: Baseline
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Panel A: Autoregressive parameters
Technology z beta (0.6,0.2) 0.896 0.891 0.867 0.914
Preference e beta (0.6,0.2) 0.598 0.591 0.471 0.709
Investment  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.834 0.813 0.741 0.882
Government g beta (0.6,0.2) 0.692 0.687 0.623 0.759
Financial  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.242 0.270 0.095 0.444
Panel B: Standard deviations
Technology z invg (0.005,2) 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.90
Monetary m invg (0.005,2) 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.38
Investment  invg (0.005,2) 1.66 1.57 0.98 1.99
Preference e invg (0.005,2) 1.03 1.06 0.96 1.15
Government g invg (0.005,2) 1.02 1.02 0.95 1.11
Financial  invg (0.005,2) 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.67
3.3 Priors
I estimate the remaining parameters: the elasticity of external risk premium, ; the capital adjust-
mentcostparameter; theCalvopriceandwageparameters  and; andtheTaylorruleparameters,
, y, and r. I also estimate the ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of all the exogenous shocks and their
respective standard deviations. Tables 2 and 3 report the prior and the posterior distributions for
each of them. Among the behavioural parameters listed in Table 2, the Taylor rule parameters, the
Calvo price and capital adjustment cost parameters are rather conventional. For the priors of these
parameters, I closely follow the existing literature. The elasticity of external risk premium  and
Calvo wage parameter  are less conventional. In the literature,  is typically calibrated at 0.05 as
in BGG. Thus, I assume that  follows a gamma distribution with mean 0.05 and standard devia-
tion 0.02. Since there is not much guidance for the average wage contracting duration, I assume
that Calvo wage parameter  follows the same prior distribution as Calvo price parameter , which
suggests that ﬁrms negotiate wage contract with workers every 3 quarters on average.
The priors of the shock processes are presented in Table 3. I follow Smets and Wouters (2007),
the priors on the shock processes are harmonized as much as possible. The standard deviation of
the shocks are assumed to follow an Inverted Gamma distribution with a mean of 0.5 per cent and
two degrees of freedom. The persistence of the shock processes is beta distributed with mean 0.6
and standard deviation 0.2.
I use Dynare 3.065 to estimate the model and use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to perform
simulations. The total number of draws is 20,000 and the ﬁrst 20 per cent draws are neglected. A
step size of 0.4 results in a rejection rate of 0.38.
194 Estimation Results
4.1 Posterior Estimates of the Parameters
Table 2 gives the mode, the mean and the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution of
the behavioral parameters. The risk premium elasticity parameter, , is estimated to be around
0.24 (mean 0.24, mode 0.23). Christensen and Dib (2008) use maximum likelihood procedure to
estimate a sticky-price model with a ﬁnancial accelerator on U.S. data and suggest that  is around
0.042. Compared to their value,  = 0:24 is much higher. Since Christensen and Dib (2008)
do not use any ﬁnancial data in their estimation, this much larger elasticity might have resulted
from the information contained in the ﬁnancial data I used in the estimation. Calvo wage contract
parameter, , is estimated to be around 0.81, suggesting a mean of ﬁve quarters between wage
contracting periods. This value is higher than the estimate of the same parameter in GST, which is
 = 0:72. This might because the ﬂow value of unemployment, ~ b; of 0.73 used in their paper is
much higher than the calibrated value of 0.4 in this paper. A higher~ b helps generate higher volatility
in unemployment and vacancies and lower volatility in real wages. Thus, with a higher ~ b, a lower 
is able to generate the same degree of wage rigidity. The estimates of the “conventional” parameters
are consistent with other studies. The degree of price stickiness, , is estimated to be 0.53, which
implies average price adjustment duration of half a year. The capital adjustment cost parameter, ,
is estimated to be around 0.22. For the monetary policy reaction function parameters, , the Taylor
rule inﬂation parameter, is estimated to be 1.68, and the reaction coefﬁcient to output gap, y; is
estimated to be -0.007, suggesting that policy respond very little to output gap. There is a relatively
low degree of interest rate smoothing, as the coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate is estimated to be
0.29.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the shock processes. The new shock, ﬁnancial wealth shock,
appears to be the least persistent shock, with an AR(1) coefﬁcient of 0.27. The technology and
investment shocks are estimated to be most persistent, with a coefﬁcient of 0.89 and 0.81, respec-
tively. The mean of the standard error of the shock to investment is 1.57, suggesting it is the most
volatile shock. In contrast, the standard deviation of the new ﬁnancial shock is relatively low at
0.54.
4.2 Empirical Fit
One way to assess how the model captures the data is to compare the volatilities of the model against
the data. Table 4 reports this information. Overall the model does a decent job in matching the
data. It does particularly well in matching the volatility in consumption, investment and inﬂation.
For the key labour market variables, the model is able to capture the fact that both unemployment
and vacancies are highly volatile and real wages are relatively rigid, although the model predicted
volatility for each of them is higher than that in the data. For ﬁnancial variables, the model is able
to capture 50% of the relative volatility in external ﬁnance cost fc:
20Table 4: Relative Standard Deviations: Model vs Data
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.82 5.02 0.44 9.29 8.10 0.28 0.20 0.24
Baseline 1 0.83 4.19 0.89 14.00 11.32 0.36 0.23 0.13
4.3 Sources of labour Market Fluctuations
Given the estimation results of the shock processes, I next simulate the model to examine the contri-
bution of each shock to the variations in the key labour market variables. Table 5 presents the results.
The ﬁnancial shock appears to be the most important shock determining the variations in unemploy-
ment and vacancies. It accounts for 37% of the variations in these two variables. Investment-speciﬁc
and technology shocks are next in importance, accounting for roughly 33% and 26% of the vari-
ations in unemployment and vacancies, respectively. For real wages, the technology shock is the
main driving force, and it accounts for 43% of the variations. The ﬁnancial shock accounts for 30%
and investment- speciﬁc shock accounts for 23% for the real wages. The result that the ﬁnancial
shock is the main driving force for both unemployment and vacancies is somewhat surprising, given
that it is the least persistent among the six shocks and has a low standard deviation. This suggests
that the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism might have played an important role in amplifying the
shock internally.
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of the Key labour Market Variables
Technology Monetary Financial Investment Preference Government
u 26.1 1.2 37.2 33.1 0.3 2.0
v 26.2 1.3 37.4 32.9 0.3 2.0
w 43.7 1.8 29.6 23.4 0.2 1.4
4.4 Ampliﬁcation Effect of the Financial Accelerator
I examine this issue by simulating the response of several key variables after the ﬁnancial shock. I
analyzetheroleofﬁnancialfrictionsbyexaminingboththebaselinemodelandthesamemodelwith
the ﬁnancial frictions reduced by half ( is reduced to 0.12).7 Figure 1 illustrates the response of
the model economy to a negative ﬁnancial shock. The solid line is the baseline model. The dotted
line is the model with  = 0:12. In both cases, following a negative ﬁnancial wealth shock, the
survivor rate of the entrepreneurs decreases, causing the aggregate net worth to fall. This drives up
the external ﬁnance premium, forcing entrepreneurs to reduce their demand for capital by reducing
investment. The fall in demand for capital is accompanied by the fall in demand for labour. Asset
7The rest of the parameters are the same for both models.
21price falls with the reduced demand for capital, and this further decreases entrepreneurs’ net worth
(Financial accelerator effect). Due to the fall in the aggregate demand for labour, employment
agencies post fewer vacancies. This reduces the probability for a worker to ﬁnd a job, and leads
the unemployment rate to rise. Notice that after the shock, the initial responses of net worth and
leverage ratio are similar for both cases; however, the response of risk premium is signiﬁcantly
greater in the baseline than in the alternative model due to the higher value of . The stronger
rise in the risk premium leads to a stronger response in demand for capital. Asset price declines
further, driving net worth further down. The ampliﬁcation effect of the ﬁnancial accelerator is more
signiﬁcant in the baseline model and this leads to stronger responses of the other variables to the
ﬁnancial shock.











































































































































































































































































































































































I further simulate the alternative model to examine the contribution of the ﬁnancial shock to the
labour market ﬂuctuation, and compare the results with that from the baseline model in Table 6.
The results suggest that with a weaker ﬁnancial accelerator effect, the ﬁnancial shock becomes less
important, contributing only 23% of the variations in unemployment and vacancies, which is a 32
per cent drop from the baseline case.
22Table 6: Variance Decomposition for labour Market Variables: a Comparison
Less friction ( = 0:12) Baseline
Shocks Unemployment Vacancy Real wage Unemployment Vacancy Real wage
Technology 33.04 33.19 49.46 25.97 26.06 43.54
Monetary 1.39 1.45 1.75 1.24 1.3 1.77
Investment 40.15 40.06 28.84 32.99 32.71 23.27
Preference 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.3 0.3 0.22
Government 1.57 1.56 1.07 1.97 1.96 1.37
Financial 23.6 23.52 18.71 37.51 37.67 29.82
4.5 Financial shock and ﬁnancial data
In order to further identify the importance of the ﬁnancial shock and ﬁnancial data, I re-estimate the
model but without the ﬁnancial shock and without the ﬁnancial time series. I compare the results
from the alternative model (NoFS model) with the baseline model in Tables 7 and 8. The estimates
of the behavioral parameters and the shock processes do not change much. There is, however,
a large change in the estimate of the elasticity of external ﬁnancing:  falls to 0.009 from 0.23.
This signiﬁcant change might reﬂect the fact that it is important to include ﬁnancial time series to
identify ﬁnancial frictions. I next explore how well the NoFS model is able to account for the
Table 7: Posterior Mode of Structural Parameters: No FS vs. Baseline
Posterior
NoFS Baseline
Mode SD Mode SD
Risk premium elasticity  0.009 0.004 0.230 0.023
Calvo wage parameter  0.628 0.039 0.810 0.014
Calvo price parameter  0.703 0.054 0.538 0.038
Capital adj. cost parameter  0.230 0.050 0.217 0.050
Taylor rule inertia r 0.238 0.047 0.275 0.046
Taylor rule inﬂation  1.841 0.086 1.675 0.062
Taylor rule output gap y 0.021 0.015 -0.006 0.009
overall volatility in the data compared to the baseline model. Table 9 presents the results. Overall,
NoFS model matches the data less well. In particular, the NoFS model does not come close to
generating the relative volatility of unemployment and vacancies in the data. Table 10 presents the
comparison of the variance decomposition of the key labour market variables for the two models.
Without the ﬁnancial shock, the technology shock becomes the most important shock: it explains
78% of the variance of unemployment and vacancies, and 96% of the variance of real wage.
23Table 8: Posterior Mode of Shock Parameters: No FS vs. Baseline
Posterior
NoFS Baseline
Mode SD Mode SD
Panel A: Autoregressive parameters
Technology z 0.897 0.012 0.896 0.015
Preference e 0.547 0.074 0.598 0.077
Investment  0.816 0.033 0.834 0.027
Government spending g 0.720 0.036 0.692 0.040
Financial  - - 0.242 0.110
Panel B: Standard deviations
Technology z 0.81 0.04 0.83 0.04
Monetary m 0.37 0.03 0.34 0.02
Investment  0.62 0.08 1.66 0.25
Preference e 1.07 0.06 1.03 0.06
Government spending g 0.98 0.05 1.02 0.05
Financial  - - 0.55 0.07
Table 9: Relative Standard Deviations: Model vs Data
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.82 5.02 0.44 9.29 8.10 0.28 0.20 0.24
NoFS 1 1.39 3.18 0.83 2.10 1.62 0.17 0.14 0.09
Baseline 1 0.83 4.19 0.89 14.00 11.32 0.36 0.23 0.13
Table 10: Variance Decomposition for labour Market Variables
No FS Baseline
Shocks Unemployment Vacancy Real wage Unemployment Vacancy Real wage
Technology 78.05 78.81 96.25 25.97 26.06 43.54
Monetary 0.7 0.7 0.31 1.24 1.3 1.77
Investment 20.94 20.21 2.13 32.99 32.71 23.27
Preference 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.3 0.3 0.22
Government 0.28 0.25 1.17 1.97 1.96 1.37
Financial - - - 37.51 37.67 29.82
245 Issues
In this section I address several issues involving the robustness of the results.
5.1 Staggered wage contracting
The previous section suggests that without the signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation effect from the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism ( = 0:009), staggered wage contracting alone cannot generate enough
volatility in unemployment and vacancies. This result seems to contradict the ﬁnding in GST that a
model with wage rigidity provides a better ﬁt for the dynamics of the labour market variables. Their
results do not rely on the ampliﬁcation effect of the ﬁnancial accelerator. However, as noticed in
the previous section, the ﬂow value of unemployment in GST, ~ b, is much higher. As suggested in
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), when ~ b is close to unity, the value of unemployment is very close
to that of employment to the worker. Since labour supply is very elastic in this case, this high ~ b
might have helped their model to capture unemployment and wage dynamics in the data. Moreover,
the workers’ bargaining power parameter, ; used in GST, is 0.9, which lies well above the range
considered in the literature, 0.5-0.7. In order to examine the effects of these “unconventional” values
on the labour market dynamics, I simulate the model using their values for ~ b and  while keeping
the rest of the parameters the same as in the NoFS case
Table 11: Relative Standard Deviations: Model Comparison
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.82 5.02 0.44 9.29 8.10 0.28 0.20 0.24
Baseline 1 0.83 4.19 0.89 14.00 11.32 0.36 0.23 0.13
NoFS 1 1.39 3.18 0.83 2.10 1.62 0.17 0.14 0.09
No FS with high ~ b and  1 0.53 4.59 0.80 13.14 10.38 0.15 0.10 0.08
Baseline w/ ﬂexible wages 1 1.97 3.40 0.88 1.79 1.45 0.46 0.29 0.21
Table 11 shows that with the higher values for the ﬂow value of unemployment and bargaining
power, the NoFS model generates similar variability in unemployment and vacancies as the baseline
model, suggesting that mechanically these unconventional values play the same role in amplifying
the responses in unemployment and vacancies to shocks as the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in
the baseline model.
Although the staggered wage contracting is not a sufﬁcient condition to generate enough vari-
ability in unemployment and vacancies, it is a necessary condition for the model in this paper to
match the data. To examine how important this type of wage setting friction is in the model, I sim-
ulate the baseline model again but assume period-by-period wage contracting (by setting  = 0),
and compare the relative volatilities of the key variables generated by the alternative model (the last
row in Table 11) with the baseline case. As Table 11 makes clear, the ﬂexible wage case is not able
to generate enough variability in unemployment and vacancies even though the external ﬁnance
25premium stays very elastic ( = 0:23). This result conﬁrms the argument of recent studies that the
conventional search models cannot account for the key cyclical movements of unemployment and
vacancies in the labour market.
Overall, Table 11 suggests that the interaction of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism and wage
setting frictions is the key for the model to match the data.
5.2 Elasticity of External Risk Premium
The elasticity of the external risk premium  is the key parameter of the ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism. In BGG,  is a “reduced form” parameter that captures ﬁnancial frictions. It is determined by
the “deep” parameters in the original BGG model: the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to the return
on capital, the bankruptcy costs, and entrepreneurs’ survival rate. In the literature, it is typically
calibrated at 0.05.8 The examples of estimated models based on BGG for US data are Christensen
and Dib (2008), De Graeve (2008) and Queijo (2009). None of these paper use ﬁnancial data.
Christensen and Dib (2008) and Queijo (2009) estimate  to be around 0.04.9 De Graeve (2008)
estimates  to be at 0.1. Compared to these values, the estimate of  = 0:23 in the baseline model
is substantially higher. As suggested in the previous section, the high value of  might be due to
the inclusion of the ﬁnancial data. In other words, the non ﬁnancial variables used in the estimation
in those studies contain very limited information on ﬁnancial frictions, thus  is underestimated.
Another example is CTW. CTW estimate a model with ﬁnancial shocks and use two ﬁnancial time
series. They have not estimated  explicitly, however, the estimated monitoring cost parameter in
their model, which is one of “deep” parameters determining , is almost 4 times higher than the one
BGG proposed.10
5.3 Estimations of Subsamples
Since the importance of the ﬁnancial shock depends  and  can be sensitive to the sample period,
I follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and divide the data into two subsamples: the ﬁrst one is the
“Great Inﬂation” period 1966:2-1979:2, and the second subsample is from 1984:1-2010:3, which
includes mostly the “Great Moderation” period and the recent recession. I estimate the model
over these two subsamples. It is well-known that output and inﬂation volatility fall considerably
during the “Great Moderation” period. Table 12 presents the standard deviations of the key macro
8See for examples, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (2000).
9Queijo (2009) does not estimate  directly; instead she estimates parameters for bankruptcy costs and survival rate
of entrepreneurs. The estimates of these parameters imply that  is 0.04.
10The estimated value of  = 0:009 in the NoFS case is lower than conventional wisdom. To investigate why 
is low in the NoFS model. I re-estimate the NoFS model using the data from the same time period from 1979Q3 to
2004Q3 as Christensen and Dib (2008). I also reset the quarterly survival rate for entrepreneurs, e, to be the value of
0.9728 used in their paper in order to capture the fact that during this period the average spread is higher. The estimate
of  is around 0.02, which is closer to the estimated value in Christensen and Dib (2008), although it is still lower. This
suggests that the difference in sample periods might be one factor contributing the difference in the estimation results.
26variables and the key labour market variables. It shows that the volatilities of the unemployment
and vacancies fall as well, although the volatility in real wage appears to stay the same. Table 13





Real wage 0.005 0.005
Vacancy 0.138 0.112
Unemployment 0.132 0.103
Nom. Interest rate 0.005 0.003
Inﬂation 0.004 0.002
compares the modes of the posterior distribution of the model parameters over these two periods.
Similar to Smets and Wouters (2007), the most signiﬁcant differences between the two subsamples
are in the variances of the shock processes. The standard deviations of all the shocks considered in
the model fall in the second period, including the ﬁnancial shock, which falls by half from 0.56 to
0.23. The persistence of these shocks changes much less for the most part; however, interestingly
the persistence of the ﬁnancial shock increases signiﬁcantly during the second period from 0.29 to
0.62. Table 14 shows that due to this increased persistence, the ﬁnancial shock accounts for a higher
portion of the variability in unemployment, vacancies and real wages.11
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I argue that the spillover effects of ﬁnancial market shocks are important for
labour market ﬂuctuations. Although the estimation results suggest that the ﬁnancial disturbance
is neither persistent nor volatile, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial shock
and generates large ﬂuctuations in the labour market. Overall, I ﬁnd that more than 30 per cent
of the variations in unemployment and vacancies is explained by the ﬁnancial shock. I show that
ignoring these ﬁnancial shocks and ﬁnancial data can reduce the model’s explanatory power. In
particular, the model without these ﬁnancial factors has difﬁculties matching the observed volatility
in unemployment and vacancies.
However, the ﬁt of the model largely relies on the value of one key parameter: , the parameter
that summarizes the frictions in the ﬁnancial market. I show that the estimate of  lies above
conventional wisdom when the ﬁnancial data is included in the estimation. To ensure that this
key parameter is well identiﬁed, more work on checking the robustness of the model is necessary.
Another line of future research would be to incorporate ﬁnancial frictions that explicitly affect ﬁrms’
11I have also estimated the model for the “Great Moderation” period only (1984:1-2004:4). The results are similar
to those from the second subsample. This might be due to that the recent recession period is relatively short, and the
“Great Moderation” periods dominate the results for the second subsample.
27Table 13: Subsample Estimates
Structural parameters Shock process
1966:1-1979:2 1984:1-2010:3 1966:1-1979:2 1984:1-2010:3
Mode SD Mode SD Mode SD Mode SD
 0.206 0.0296 0.2139 0.0203 z 0.9039 0.0267 0.8491 0.0263
 0.7704 0.0312 0.8107 0.0162 e 0.5499 0.1531 0.6645 0.073
 0.5778 0.0412 0.5678 0.0406  0.8668 0.0317 0.8553 0.022
 0.2383 0.05 0.2202 0.0502 g 0.6944 0.0768 0.6253 0.0568
r 0.317 0.0658 0.4976 0.0554  0.29 0.1716 0.6203 0.1085
 1.5068 0.0822 1.8207 0.0839 z 0.99 0.09 0.56 0.04
y 0.017 0.0208 -0.0165 0.0146 m 0.35 0.04 0.2 0.02
 2.16 0.47 1.54 0.22
e 1.39 0.17 0.83 0.06
g 1.12 0.11 0.91 0.06
 0.56 0.11 0.23 0.04
Table 14: Variance Decomposition: Subsamples
1966:1-1979:2 1984:1-2010:3
Unemployment Vacancy Real wage Unemployment Vacancy Real wage
Technology 30.56 30.6 58.76 13.71 13.89 25.72
Monetary 1.32 1.41 1.73 1.82 1.9 2.84
Investment 33.05 32.65 17.56 41.97 41.62 33
Preference 0.4 0.4 0.21 0.44 0.44 0.36
Government 2.09 2.09 1.02 1.86 1.86 1.56
Financial 32.58 32.86 20.71 40.2 40.3 36.52
28hiring decisions into a monetary DSGE model. As the existing literature has already shown, ﬁrms’
hiring activities can be directly related to how easily ﬁrms are able to access external funds. It
would be interesting to evaluate the impact of this type of ﬁnancial frictions on unemployment and
vacancies at the aggregate level.
297 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Aggregation of labour and Capital Demand, Aggregation
of Net Worth










Since all the ﬁrm j has the same output labour ratio, aggregating this ﬁrst order condition yields
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which can be written as
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7.2 Appendix B: Contract Wage
7.2.1 Period-by-period Nash Bargaining Contract Wage
For standard period-by-period Nash bargaining, the ﬁrst order condition is12
Jt = (1   )Ht:
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7.2.2 Solving for Staggered Wage Contract
First Order Condition for Wage Now turning to the staggered wage contract. The ﬁrst order




















12Since it is period-by-period Nash bargaining, there is no need to have subscript i to indicate for the ﬁrm that
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Combining terms, we have

































33We can show that
Wt(i) = tw
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For Ht(i) we have
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Substituting equation (37) into the above equation; we obtain
Ht(i) = tw
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34For the value of job Jt(i) , we have
Jt(i) = p
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(38) and (40) into Nash bargaining ﬁrst-order condition











































































The aggregate wage wn
t can be written as
w
n
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t + pt 1wt 1:
Thus in real terms we have






Now we replace Ht+1 in the target wage equation with relative hiring rate (xt(i)   xt) and
relative wage (wt   w
t): Given that













































































and we also use














in the derivation of the above equation. We can then write the ﬁrst order condition of Nash bargain-
ing as
tEtJt+1(i) = (1   t)EtHt+1(i)




























37Now the target wage can be expressed in terms of (wt   w
t) and (xt(i)   xt)
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then the targeted wage can be further written as
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7.4 Appendix D: Log-linearized System of Equations
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 and w are solved from the following two steady-state conditions
x = 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